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Foreign Exchange*
By George E. Roberts
When we speak of foreign exchange we mean the relation be
tween our money and the money of other countries and the cost of
converting a sum in our money or bank credit into foreign money
or bank credit, or the reverse. If I have $1,000 in a New York bank,
what can I get for it in terms of a bank deposit in London, Paris,
Berlin, Madrid, Genoa, Bombay, Yokohama, Buenos Aires or
wherever I may want to use it? Or, if somebody sends me a
cheque or draft on a bank in one of those cities, what can I get for
it in dollars here in New York, assuming, of course, that the
bank on which it is drawn is good and will pay it on presentation.
There are two principal factors in it: first, the relation of the
currencies to a common standard of value and, second, the state
of trade between the countries. Before the outbreak of the great
war, by a gradual process of evolution, nearly all the important
nations had brought their currencies into fixed relations to the gold
standard. The dollar of the United States meant the value of
23.22 grains of fine gold, the pound sterling of Great Britain
meant the value of 113 grains of gold, and so the franc of France,
the mark of Germany, the guilder of Holland, the crown of
Austria- Hungary, the ruble of Russia, the yen of Japan—each
meant the value of a certain number of grains of gold; and
you could ship the coins of any of these countries to any other
country having the gold standard and have them re-coined
into the money of that country. By reason of their fixed relations
to the grain of gold they were in fixed relation to each other,
subject to the cost of transportation and recoinage, which was very
small. The equivalent of the gold sovereign in United States
*An address delivered at a meeting of the New York State Society of Certified
Public Accountants, December 8, 1919.
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money, based on the gold contents, was $4.8665, and before the
war, whenever exchange charges either way would vary from that
by more than two cents, gold would begin to move.
On the other hand, China has been a silver standard country,
and the rates of exchange between China and the gold standard
countries have fluctuated with the gold value of silver bullion.
At the outbreak of the war silver was worth about 55 cents an
ounce and silver is worth now about $1.30 an ounce. So if you
have a payment to make in Chinese taels, which means a certain
weight of silver, the exchange of dollars into taels takes more than
twice as many dollars as before the war.
Of course, when the European countries, after the outbreak
of the war, began to issue paper money in excess of their ability
to redeem it in gold, their currencies lost their fixed relations to
the gold standard and became depreciated; and the depreciation
entered into exchange rates.
That relationship of currencies to each other through their
relationship to a common standard is one factor in exchange
rates.
Then there is the effect of the state of trade. Distance and
trade relations may be a factor in exchange rates even within one
country and under the same monetary system, but exchange
charges under such conditions are usually small.
Before coming to a study of the foreign trade situation I
think it may be well to illustrate it first by a situation within our
own country, where no conversion from one currency into an
other is necessary.
Let us suppose that the state of Oklahoma, by reason of a
prolonged drought, has a crop failure. It has very little to sell
and with which to offset the purchases which it must make in the
outside markets. It buys nearly all its merchandise from outside
and usually pays largely by means of its crops. Oklahoma will
have a state of unbalanced trade. The burden of making the
settlements falls first on the bankers. The merchant will come
to his banker and say: “I have to carry a great many of my cus
tomers over until they make another crop. I have sold them
my goods, and I have to sell them more goods in the meantime, but
I can’t get any pay and you will have to help me pay my bills in

322

Foreign Exchange
the east, and help me carry this load.” The banker will lend to the
merchant, and draw down his balances with his correspondent
banks outside as low as he dares. Then if he has any municipal
or railroad bonds which are marketable in the eastern markets
he will sell them, to replenish his balances. And then he will
present the case to his correspondent banks and borrow to re
plenish his balances. And the merchant, having got as much
from his banker as he can, will fall back on the jobbers or manu
facturers of whom he buys, and obtain extensions from them,
and the merchant and banker will go to their customers, and, if
possible, get them to give mortgages which can be sold outside
and thus create credits and help to correct the unbalanced state
of trade.
Here you see is no question of currency nor an exchange of
one currency into another. It is wholly a question of getting
credit to balance an unbalanced state of trade, and the condi
tions are much the same as in the relations between the European
countries and the United States at this time. In both cases there
is a necessity for credit. In the case of Europe it shows itself in
the exchange rates. The high rates of exchange are something
more than a charge for transmission or collection. They amount
to a bid or charge for credit. In the case of Oklahoma the de
mand for credit does not figure in the exchange rates. The
money is the same, the relations are much more intimate and
it is plain borrowing.
Now, turn from the case of Oklahoma, as I have supposed it,
to the case of Canada. The United States sold to Canada last
year about $700,000,000 worth of products, and Canada sold to
this country about $400,000,000. There is another case of unbal
anced trade, not due to crop failure, but there is the same kind
of a situation to consider. The sales of Canadian products in
this country created only about one-half enough credits to offset
the Canadian purchases. The Canadian banks could draw drafts
up to $400,000,000, and then their balances would be exhausted,
unless they were replenished by some other means. If the Canad
ian banks had gold that they could spare they might ship it to
New York and draw against it, but they have had no gold to
spare. The total gold reserves of Canada are only about $200,-
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000,000, and in the present state of the exchanges they might all
be drained away, so the government has maintained an embargo
on gold exports since the beginning of the war.
If it was known that this trade balance was only temporary,
if it was of a seasonal character, running one way part of the
year and the other way in the rest of the year, the Canadian
bankers might borrow in this country to tide over the situation;
but they don’t know that. Exchange between this country and
Canada is very closely involved with exchange between New York
and London, so the Canadian banks dare not borrow heavily for
settlement purposes. The situation is too unsettled and runs into
too much money.
Here is a situation where our old friend the law of supply and
demand comes into play. There is a demand in Canada for more
credits in the United States than are normally supplied, com
petition results and exchange goes to a premium. In Montreal,
Toronto and other Canadian cities exchange on New York is
commanding a premium of 5 to 6 per cent. Now see what that
does: it offers an inducement for the creation of New York ex
change. It is an open offer to anybody to come forward and
furnish credits in New York for Canadian use. Anyone who will
borrow in New York can sell the credit in Canada at a premium
of 5 per cent, or if a Canadian holds bonds or stocks that are
salable in the American market he may sell them, take his pay in
a cheque on a bank in one of our centers and sell the cheque to a
Canadian bank at a premium. Again, Canadian merchants may
obtain credit from jobbers and manufacturers in this country or
may induce them to take their pay in Canada. One way and
another, by transactions like these, that $400,000,000 trade balance
has been settled or adjusted for the time being. American manu
facturers have millions of dollars of deposits in Canadian banks
received by their Canadian agencies in payment for goods, which
they are leaving there hoping for a more favorable time to bring
them home. The treasurer of a prominent firm of farm imple
ment manufacturers told me recently that they had over $2,000,000 in Canadian banks, accumulated in that way.
I want to emphasize that these exchange charges are not made
arbitrarily by bankers. They are not charges for the benefit of
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bankers and they are not under the control of bankers. A banker
has to buy practically all the foreign exchange he sells and pay
the market price for it, just as a merchant has to buy goods to
meet the wants of his customers. Furthermore, it is only by
offering a premium, or, in other words, by paying for the service,
that people can be induced to come forward and create exchange
under abnormal conditions and to meet special demands.
The exchange situation between this country and Europe is
very much more acute than between this country and Canada. In
the first place the trade is more unbalanced; the balances are
larger in proportion to the volume of trade; and, again, the rela
tions between this country and Canada, between the buyers and
sellers who are dealing with each other, are closer, and it is easier
to accomplish the various shifts by which settlements are made
or postponed. Furthermore, the relations, business and financial,
between the United States and England are closer than between
the United States and the continent, and the relations between
London and New York are not so bad as between New York and
the cities of the continent, but they are well-nigh desperate in
any case.
The European countries have need to buy more of us than
in normal times, and they have neither gold nor goods to pay.
Their industries are disorganized, and many of them are in need
of raw materials which they can get nowhere except of us. And
so we have seen the European exchanges sinking lower and
lower from month to month; or, if you will turn the situation
around and see it from the European standpoint, American ex
change has been rising higher and higher, until it has become
almost prohibitive.
It is no secret that the food administration of the British gov
ernment is buying wheat and other foodstuffs in this country
now and selling drafts on the British treasury at current rates to
obtain the means of payment. There is no question about the
payment of these pounds sterling in London—the discount is all
because of the difficulty of finding someone who wants to use
pounds sterling in London, and London is the most cosmopolitan
market for commodities and investments in the world. The
British people hold investments all around the world. You can
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buy securities representing nitrate companies in Chili, railroads in
Argentina, railroads and public utilities in Brazil and investments
all over South America, in Canada and elsewhere, and use a
London credit for that purpose. You can buy any security on
the London market at more than 25 per cent discount from the
price which the seller gets for it, by making the purchase from
the United States by the use of sterling exchange. This is an
extraordinary situation. It is not because the credit of Great
Britain is broken down; for, if desired, the credit can be converted
immediately into investments in countries that have not been in
the war. It is partly that our people are not accustomed to for
eign investments, and largely because there seems to be so much
use for money at home.
The cotton mills of Lancashire are running upon cotton which
is going forward from this country, bought with sterling exchange
yesterday at about $3.75. And when you turn the situation
around and consider the discount on sterling as a premium on the
dollar it amounts to about 33⅓ per cent.
And if the situation with England is bad, that with France is
worse. The premium on New York exchange in Paris is about
130 per cent. We think prices are high in this country; but how
can the French people pay these prices, and in addition a premium
of 100 per cent upon New York exchange, and then pay the
abnormal ocean transportation charges besides?
And in the case of Italy the situation is still worse. Italy is
without coal, iron, copper, cotton or oil. She produces none of
these common necessaries, and this is almost the only country
where she can get them. How can she do without them? And
how can she afford to buy them at such cost? Before the war
both Italy and France imported coal from England, but under
labor troubles there production has fallen off until England has
almost none to spare. We had word the other day that 3,500
factories using electric power in Paris and vicinity were shut
down for want of coal. The coal strike in this country probably
has put an end to coal exports even if credits were arranged.
Cotton mills are idle to-day in Italy, France, Belgium,
Germany, Poland, Bohemia and Austria, and the skilled opera
tives are idle and supported by unemployment doles, because
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they cannot finance the purchase of cotton—and our supply of
cotton is the largest in years and far beyond the capacity of our
mills to work up. Our own consumption of cotton this year is
behind that of last year.
A financial committee has been in this country for months
from Czecho-Slovakia, trying to get a loan of $25,000,000 or $30,000,000 to be expended here for cotton and other raw materials.
They have been able to get about $5,000,000. There are commis
sions or representatives here from nearly every country on the
continent upon the same mission, and I don’t believe any American
can hear their pathetic pleas without wishing every citizen of
rich and prosperous America might hear them.
The dislocation of exchange is approaching an actual break
down of international trade relations. The lower these exchanges
go the greater the offerings have to be to make the same pur
chases. They are giving up what is real wealth, and the point
is being approached when it is scarcely conceivable that purchases
can go on.
The situation gives one a painful feeling of the incapacity or
ineffectiveness of the social organization. It is due to a want of
co-ordination and unity in the world society, as most of our
troubles are. Modern, highly organized society has never known
such a state of helplessness. Europe is thrown back into primitive
conditions with a population which cannot be supported under
primitive conditions. They must have supplies of food and raw
materials for their industries from outside themselves or all
European society is in danger of going into chaos. Mr. Hoover
has estimated that 100,000,000 people in Europe west of Russia
must be fed from outside that territory or they will die. That is
not so extraordinary a statement when you understand that even
in normal times before the war 70,000,000 people west of Russia
had to obtain their food from Russia and outside of Europe, but
in normal times they paid for this food by means of the exports
which were normally flowing out. Now the food imports must
be larger and there are fewer exports to meet them.
This is one of the great crises of the world’s history, and the
hopes of Europe naturally center in the United States. The war
touched the United States but lightly as compared with Europe.
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We prospered through it, in spite of it, and to some extent by
means of it. We are richer as a people than when the war began,
with greater productive capacity. The wealth-producing capacity
of the United States is from one-third to one-half that of all the
world. In capacity to produce steel and iron, labor-saving ma
chinery and all kinds of industrial equipment, this country is
practically equal to all the rest of the world put together. And
so it is of supplies of some important raw materials. We have
the resources and the ability to increase the production of those
things as no other country can.
We have what Europe needs, and what she can get prac
tically nowhere else. At any rate she can get relief promptly no
where else, and she needs it promptly. Furthermore, we have the
financial resources for providing the relief. We went into the
war a debtor country and came out a creditor country. We have
bought back in large part the American securities formerly
owned in Europe, and bought them at very low prices by selling
war supplies and foodstuffs at very high prices. And the fact
that they have sold their American securities makes them more
helpless in their present situation for they have denuded them
selves of their liquid assets.
Now that is the situation and the relation in which Europe and
America stand to each other to-day. But desperate as the situa
tion may appear on the surface, Europe is by no means unworthy
of credit. The chief risk, and I would say the only risk, in ex
tending credit to Europe is that of social disorder, that all gov
ernments may be submerged, all obligations dishonored, and so
ciety thus lapse into utter and final ruin. But I have too much
faith in mankind to believe that that will happen, especially if they
have help to get on their feet and reorganize their industries and
give employment to their people.
We say that Europe ought to get to work, but it is slow getting
to work without tools or materials or credits.
The people of Europe have something to offer as a basis of
credit. The soil of Europe, the natural resources, the industrial
works and accumulated wealth of all kinds and, finally and most
important of all, the population of Europe are abundant assets.
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Industry and Skill Abroad
The people of Europe are industrious and skillful. They are
a wealth-producing, thrifty people. Those countries are not bank
rupt. It is true their indebtedness is large, but most of it is held
by themselves and counts as assets as well as liabilities. No people
ever went broke making payments to themselves. National in
debtedness involves some problems of taxation, but where the
payments of interest and principal are back to the residents and
taxpayers of the same country, the problem is comparatively
simple. The payment of indebtedness does not extinguish the
capital transferred.
These people are not bankrupt simply because they cannot
pay down on the nail. They are in the same position as farmers
who have lost their crops, but still have their farms. The farmers
have nothing to sell, and they have to buy seed and live somehow
until they can raise another crop. Every country banker knows that
there is an obligation upon him to be liberal with credits at such
a time. There isn’t a country merchant who doesn’t know that
he is interested in carrying his customers through and in supplying
them with what they need to make the next crop.
The European situation is that of not having transportable
wealth. They cannot ship their houses or lands or industrial works,
their coal mines or forests or railways across the ocean, but they
can send us securities based on these properties and pledging the
income from them.
Now we have an interest in this situation on the business
side. The industrial activity which has prevailed over this country
this year has been largely due to the foreign demand for our
products. Since the United States entered the war in 1917 the
United States government has lent nearly $10,000,000,000 to for
eign governments, nearly all of which has been expended in this
country for the products of the soil and shops. It has made
$2,000,000,000 of such loans since the armistice was signed. Our
productive capacity has been expanded under this demand. In
farm products the best authorities say that we have a surplus
which, together with that of other exporting countries, is suffi
cient to meet the needs of Europe.
I know that some people argue that it would be better to

329

The Journal of Accountancy

have our exports fall off, for then prices would fall, but there is
another side to that. If we lose rapidly not only our export
business but one-fourth or one-half the buying power of the farm
ing districts of this country, what will be the effect upon our in
dustries generally.
I want to see prices come down, but I think the best way
of accomplishing it is by getting people back to work all over the
world and increasing production. That will be a gradual process,
and industry will adjust itself to it in all branches together and
it will be a return to normal conditions. It isn’t going to reduce
the price of cotton cloth anywhere to keep the cotton mills of
Europe idle. The price of sugar is not going to come down until
the sugar-producing industry of Europe is revived. We want
to see the cost of living lowered by reason of an abundance of
the necessaries of life for all people, rather than by a glut of
products in this country while people are starving elsewhere. We
can never get back to normal conditions in the market until normal
production is restored.
There are two views to take of this situation. First, with
consideration for our obligation as the richest and most powerful
nation in the world, to come forward in this emergency and do
our part to re-establish industry and order in Europe. And then
there is the consideration from a business standpoint, having
regard for our position as a creditor nation. It is a new position
for us, but it involves certain obligations and responsibilities. A
nation can no more hold a creditor position and not recognize
those obligations than a bank can hold its deposits and recognize
no obligation to make loans. What would you say of a rich man
who in time of public calamity refused to use his wealth in any
way, even for business purposes, for the relief of the situation?
If we aspire to high position in international affairs, to leader
ship in world finance, we must have the vision and courage and
public spirit to play the part.
We have come into this situation suddenly, as the result of
the war. Great Britain and Germany grew into their great foreign
trade gradually as the result of their foreign investments. We
are confronted now with the questions: “Can we rise promptly
to an appreciation of the situation? Can we develop a body of
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foreign investors ? Are we willing to lend and lend and lend con
tinually to support and develop our foreign trade? Will our in
vestment market take up the offerings that will have to be made
here in order to hold the exchange situation level ?
The fact is that we have brought our industries to such a
stage of development, and developed our wealth so far beyond that
of other countries, that in the very nature of things it is now to
our interest to be a lending nation to help to bring forward the
backward nations.
There is a morality in the economic law, or, to put it differ
ently, the economic law and the moral law are one. The funda
mentals of universal law are never in conflict with each other.
What is our duty to do it is also our interest to do.
There is an obligation upon us to assist in restoring industrial
order in the devastated countries of Europe, to put these people
back into their homes and workshops, to supply them with the
means of becoming self-supporting and prosperous again; and it
is to our interest to do so, because it will furnish employment
to our industries.
Some people speak hopelessly about our ever recovering the
amount of our loans to Europe. I do not feel so at all, but I
think it is to our interest not to attempt to collect either principal
or interest for some years to come. If the foreign governments
were to attempt, under any such conditions as exist at present,
to gather up exchange to pay the interest, it would send American
exchange to a still higher premium and cut off our exports.
On the other hand, there are a few people who say that we
ought to forgive and cancel the obligations which the United
States government holds; but I do not think there is any occasion
to do that. What we ought to do is to add the interest to the
principal until these countries have recovered from the war, and
lend them what further help we can to restore and increase their
productive capacity. If we do that these debts will be of con
stantly diminishing importance. If development in industry is
as great in the next thirty years as it was in the last thirty, these
debts will be of relatively small importance.
The indebtedness of England at the close of the war with
Napoleon was greater in proportion to the wealth of the country
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than her indebtedness of to-day, and she never did pay off that
old debt, but by the development of steam power, by the improve
ments of her industries, she so increased her productive capacity
that she was able to supply capital in the form of equipment for
the building of railroads in America and for opening up other
parts of the world, with the result that she opened up great mar
kets and at the same time secured cheaper food for her people,
and created the greatest era of prosperity ever known to England.
And so I expect these debts to be paid, not by grinding the
people, not by taxation that will lower their productive powers,
but by increasing the productive capacities of the people. They
will be paid by the same kind of development that has been
characteristic of industry in the last forty years.
I believe that before many years it will be possible to refund
all these foreign debts in the open American market, so that they
will be held by individual investors of all nations, and no longer
be a matter of public concern.
I have made these remarks without reference to any movement
now pending to provide credits. I am sorry to say that at the
moment no organized movement is under way. Early in the
summer a movement was started by New York and Chicago
bankers to form a nation-wide organization for this purpose, but
it soon developed that the reasons for the movement were not
understood and that the motives behind it were questioned. It
could not possibly be a success under such conditions, and so it
has been held up. The feeling among bankers has been that the
administration at Washington should take the lead, at least in im
pressing upon the country the fact that it is a matter of national
concern. There is no doubt that the officers of the government
recognize the importance of providing credits for Europe, but
the situation at Washington has been complex and not favorable
for action.
It is not desirable that the government should continue to
make foreign loans. It would have to offer its own obligations
on the market to provide the means, and it would not want to
sell its bonds at rates above those carried by the issues outstanding.
The public cannot be expected to lend to Europe upon that basis.
The rate should not be excessive, but it should be fair to lenders
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in view of present conditions.
is to have the credits provided.

The important thing to Europe

The Edge Bill

The Edge bill, which is now pending, will authorize the estab
lishment of banking corporations with a capital of $2,000,000 or
more, which may issue debentures against foreign obligations in
their hands. If the bill becomes a law such corporations may be
organized in numerous localities to raise capital to finance the
trade of those localities, or they may be organized by different lines
of industry to finance their exports. The measure undoubtedly
provides the means by which much foreign financing may be done.
The only question about it is whether such division of efforts will
accomplish as large results as a concentration of effort upon the
sale of one security in all parts of the country.
All who understand the conditions upon which credits must
be granted realize that they must run longer than the term of
ordinary commercial credits, and that therefore they cannot be
carried by the commercial banks or the federal reserve banks. The
commercial banks are under obligations to keep themselves liquid
to meet the current commercial demands upon them. The federal
reserve banks have no authority under the law to extend such
credits, which confessedly are not self-liquidating. They must
be placed in the hands of investors who will take them and pay for
them out of savings.
The most serious feature of the situation is in the condition
of the investment market in this country. It is overloaded with
offerings; our own government bonds are lower than during
the war; and the entire security list is at a level which shows a
want of buying power. The foreign government issues that have
been brought out here since the armistice are all selling below the
level at which they were issued. The taxation upon business
profits is so heavy that purchasing power in that quarter is im
paired, while the hopes of a new army of bond-buyers, which
were raised during the war, seem to have vanished in the wild
carnival of spending which has been raging since the armistice was
signed. In the face of a world situation which calls for the
most strenuous efforts to increase production and the most resolute
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personal economy to help make good the inevitable shortage, we
have a general relaxation of effort either to produce or to save, due,
we must believe, to failure to appreciate the gravity of the situation.
Our people say that they have no money to put into foreign securi
ties, but if our foreign trades cease abruptly the people may then
discover that they might have bought the foreign securities and
by sustaining our export trade have had more money for other
uses and have preserved better social conditions at home while
rendering help that was vital to Europe.
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